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MECHANISM DESIGN FOR DEMAND RESPONSE
PROGRAMS WITH FINANCIAL AND
NON-MONETARY (SOCIAL) INCENTIVES
Mateo Alejandro Cortés Guzmán and Eduardo Mojica-Nava
Abstract—Most demand management approaches with non-
mandatory policies assume full users’ cooperation, which may
not be the case given users’ beliefs, needs and preferences. In
this paper we propose a mechanism for demand management in-
cluding incentives both with and without money. The mechanism
is validated by means of simulation, modeling the consumers as
a finite multiagent system which evolves until a stable state, and
social incentives diffusion using opinion dynamics.
Index Terms—mechanism design, demand management, game
theory, incentives, opinion dynamics, preferences.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEmand side management—DSM [22], understood with isbroader connotation enclosing Demand Response, energy
efficiency and another ways of modifying electricity demand
— is nowadays a widely discussed topic since optimization
of the power system infrastructure and electricity use arose
as topic of interest aiming to reduce climatic change and
environmental impact of energy generation. In particular, the
problem of demand response–DR– has been approached from
various perspectives as the technical side, involving direct
load control, the financial side, with differential tariffs –
day/night, hourly–, the informational side, with the inclusion
of interactivity with the consumers through smart grids and
from the game theory perspective, considering the problem as
a Stackelberg game [3], [14], [30] where the service provider is
a leader and the consumers are price takers, following leader’s
indication to maximize their profit.
Fotouhi Ghazvini et al. [8] present an incentive-based
demand response programs approach for retail electricity
providers with DG–distributed generation assets and energy
storage systems, starting from the fact that for some countries,
there are financial risks regarding the price variations due
to contracts made when buying energy for a price that is
then sold for a smaller value. They formulate a two-stage
scenario-based stochastic problem which aims to establish the
required financial incentive and the optimal dispatch of DG
units and energy storage systems usage–for the day-ahead
market–, thus minimizing the ERP risk of financial losses
by reducing power peaks–when electricity prices are higher–
Even if their rationale is not fully applicable in a country like
Colombia1 where the domestic users are regulated, the concept
of including stochastic decision parameters can be adapted and
applied to the particular case, adressing the uncertainty about
1Where the electricity retailer has a guaranteed retribution for the energy
it sells.
consumers’ preferences with the incorporation of stochastic
decision parameters into their utility function. They mention
[8] the difficulty of knowing electricity consumers’ behavior
and translating qualitative valuations to numeric variables that
can be computed when designing DR programs. This paper
addresses the problem by modeling the consumers as a multi-
agent system –MAS–, and using opinion dynamics to model
the social interaction and the evolution of users’ preferences
and beliefs, starting from an initial condition.
Thimmapuram et al. [26] show an analysis of the effect
of price elasticity on deregulated markets, where they make
assumptions about the consumers characterization and their
responsiveness to electricity price variations and use a MAS
approach2 to model the adaptation process of the users. They
state the inherent difficulty and complexity of measuring
price elasticity, and estimations usually have high uncertainty.
According to their recopilation of several elasticity studies, for
residential costumers in the tradditional setting–without smart
meters– the price-load curve has a variable steep between
−0.06 and −0.49 and in their simulation experiment, the
achieved load reduction by changing price was about 5%.
Regarding game theory and mechanism design approach,
Nekouei et al. [19] have proposed a mechanism for demand
management both at energy-market and small-consumers level.
The former is treated as a Stackelberg game where generators
are followers, and the latter is tackled with a VCG-like
mechanism, ensuring consumers to reveal their true type–
preferences–. The implementation is thought for application
in South Australia, as for the power system structure and
behavior. Haring et al. [11] propose an incentive compatible
mechanism as solution for the power supply in imbalance
conditions requiring the use of ancillary services–AS–, treating
the matter from the global perspective of the energy-market,
without directly considering consumers’ role but their aggre-
gated demanded energy and power-flow in the transmission
system.3 The balancing energy parties–BRP— make the re-
source allocation based on their willingness to pay, modeled
as a polynomial function depending on the energy demanded
from AS during a period. They maximize transmission system
operator’s utility, as well as BRP assets.
Mhanna et al. [15] propose a distributed mechanism for
day-ahead residential demand scheduling, making an effort
to get a realistic implementation of the designed mechanism.
2Using EMCAS software, a tool developed by the US Argonne National
Laboratory for electric market related studies.
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They address four common assumptions: first, the treatment
of household energy levels as continuous4, when they are
actually a mix of continuous and discrete levels. Mhana et
al. approximate the nonconvex problem by using mixed inte-
ger linear programming–MILP and an existing MILP solver.
Second, the representation of a household’s–user– valuation
function by a concave increasing function5, which they assume
rather constant and large for any device consumption profile–
schedule– that satisfies the user’s preferences. In the present
work, these assumption is adopted and modified, taking an
evolving value for an user’s valuation of her electricity con-
sumption, modeled by means of opinion dynamics. Third,
for the payment schemes based on an energy allocation that
will be fully accurate, while it might not be the case; they
propose a scoring rule-based payment which takes into account
both day-ahead allocation and actual consumption, rewarding
the accuracy of meeting the allocations. Finally, the implicit
centralized implementation approach of mechanism design,
where they take a distributed approach, in order to relax
the computation requirements of a traditional centralized ap-
proach. With the previous assumptions, they get a mechanism
that is asymptotically dominant incentive compatible, weakly
budget balanced and fair in the charges to users–households–.
As electricity supply is in most places–if not all– a public
service and therefore must be granted to all inhabitants,
enforcing policies for consumption change or mandatory taxes
to higher consumptions are not really a practical option and
there is no point in trying to reach an optimal use of the grid
if consumers are not aware of it and willing to collaborate.
Tackling this issue social networks models come to action,
as consumers could be modeled as an information network
of opinions reflecting users level of agreement to a certain
measure or policy targeting DR. Furthermore, the DR program
proposed to users can be not only the acceptance of financial
incentives, but to include some policies with an environmen-
tal or social background, which requires users participation
modifying their consumption according to a reference signal
indicating if lower or higher consumption is required, and
should be voluntarily followed appealing to moral conscience
and empathy from people.
By modeling the information layer of the users as a graph,
opinion dynamics approach can be used to study users’ beliefs
evolution, constraining the demand response programs and
incentives efficiency to a more realistic outcome considering
that not all the society should actively participate in a certain
DR program. A former approach of including social incentives
for DR programs design is presented by Mojica-Nava et
al. [17], where users are assumed to follow a leader or
prominent agent–which imposes the desired behavior– and
deviate from their natural preferences proportionally to the
leader’s influence exerted to each agent.
The foundation for including social incentives as modifiers
for consumers behavior comes from its relationship with
morality, discussed by several studies of altruist behavior in
a society, giving some evidence that the actual behavior of
4Continuous energy levels imply a convex optimization problem, hence
easier to solve.
5Following the diminishing marginal utility principle.
people is not fully commanded by selfish principles, as stated
by Adam Smith [9], or as the evidence suggested by the recent
study of Crockett et al. [4] about moral behavior when we have
a choice of whether harm or not to the fellow.
II. OPINION DYNAMICS MODEL FOR DOMESTIC
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS CHARACTERIZATION
Graph theory has the tools to model the interactions between
a group of agents whom may have some kind of relationship,
and has been extensively used to model different kind of sys-
tems and networks, like internet, power systems–for a region
or a country–, the network of scientific papers (citations) or
interactions in social networks, just to name a few. As it
would not be feasible to take the information of interactions
and influences only from actual electricity consumers, the
fact that many of the above mentioned real world networks
can be modeled as a small world network6 is taken as base
to model the interaction of users’ opinion concerning the
adoption or rejection of a DR oriented measure as a small-
world random graph. Small-world networks are characterized
for having a short average path between nodes and high
clustering coefficient than classic random networks [20], while
most nodes are connected to just a few neighbours, but also
have a path to reach any other node in the network.
There are two well-known models for generating small-
world networks that have been compared and validated with
empirical data: the Watts-Strogatz–WS– model, which reflects
adequately the clustering seen in real networks, and the
Barabási-Albert–BA– model, in which there is a starting seed
network which is growth using the preferential attachment
rule until the network desired size is reached. The BA model
reflects better the degree distribution across the network, but
does not represent clustering as good as WS model. In the
application case presented in this paper, WS model is used.
If we represent the information exchange between a group
of people with a graph, we can derive some analytical formu-
lation of the group’s interaction, namely opinion dynamics,
which aims to model the way interactions take place in a
given group and how people’s opinion about certain topic may
evolve, and predict the actual choices made in the group.
One of the first opinion dynamics models is the one devised
by DeGroot in 1974 [5], with his approach to reach a consen-
sus of opinions between a group of persons considering the
weighted adjacency matrix as an influence network. Friedkin
and Johnsen in 1990 [6], studied the topic as social influence
network theory. Years later they came to propose a model
[7] of the interactions of a group of n persons, taking into
consideration the susceptibility to change of each individual,
as well as the influence of every neighbor’s opinion in an
weighted average profit function that ultimately led to con-
sensus. Their model is still the core for more recent social
networks modeling, and unlike most other models, it has been
validated in small and medium population groups for several
problems [21]. Hegselmann and Krause [12] proposed a mod-
ified model taking into account a confidence factor, which
limited the group of neighbors whose opinion influenced one
6An special type of random network.
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person’s particular beliefs, to those within a similarity range
called bounded confidence, maintaining the averaged opinion
calculation with the neighbors in the bounded confidence
subset. More recently, Mirtabatabaei et al. [16] have proposed
a modification of the Friedkin-Johnsen’s model, including
coefficients to characterize various parameters of the social
interaction of a group of individuals discussing a sequence of
issues. The basic FJ dynamic as used by [16] is shown in eq.1,
σi(t+ 1) = (1− µi)σi(0) + µiAiiσi(t)
+µi(1−Aii)
n∑
j=1
Aijσj(t);
(1)
where, for the individual i, the term σi(t) is the opinion
at time t, µi the susceptibility to change her initial opinion,
Aii the self-confidence of person about a particular issue,
and Aij the credibility given to neighbors’ opinion, contained
in the weighted adjacency matrix A of thee graph, that is
row stochastic with zero diagonal [7]. [16] assumes some
simplifications for Friedkin-Johnsen’s model, regarding the
coupling between prejudices and initial conditions. FJ model is
proposed for both the consumer’s valuation of energy and the
willingness to enroll in a certain DR program that encourages
users with alternate–non monetary– benefits.
III. MAS MODEL OF THE DOMESTIC ELECTRICITY
CONSUMERS
Taking a perspective from distributed control, electricity
demand side can be modeled by means of evolutionary game
theory [2], [17], [29], where a group of individuals change
their state over time trying to maximize their profit.
The detailed evolution of a population of agents, i.e how and
when they update their strategies as time passes, is called a
revision protocol. The set of a revision protocol, which models
the population dynamic, and a population game, which models
the strategic environment for the players, define a stochastic
evolutionary process [24], [29], that, according to the law of
large numbers7 [23], if the number of agents is very large it
can derive a deterministic process called mean dynamic.
According to Sandholm [23], a revision protocol ρp is a
map ρp : Rnp × Xp → Rnp×np+ . The scalar ρpij(pip, xp)
is called conditional switch rate, from strategy i ∈ Sp to
strategy j ∈ Sp, given payoff vector pip and population state
xp. When using a revision protocol, it is assumed that each
agent has a Poisson alarm clock with independent ring time,
at rate R. For each alarm ring, the agent has an opportunity
for strategy revision, switching to j 6= i with probability
ρpij/R and keeping strategy i with probability 1−
∑
j 6=i ρ
p
ij/R.
When an agent changes her strategy, population’s state changes
accordingly having into account the agent’s decision.
One of the most studied and used is the replicator dynamics,
which is an imitation dynamic that conditions the change of
strategy of a user to a repeated comparison with the profit of
other population’s individuals; if the individual i’s payoff is
7Which states that given a large number of agents the noise due to extreme
preferences is eliminated in the average behavior.
lower than that of individual j’s, she may update her strategy
to the strategy played by j and continue the interactions.
According to Sandholm [23] pure replicator dynamics violate
Nash stationarity, which is required for the dynamics to
converge in a finite time, and it is necessary to include at
least an small proportion of a mixed dynamic with direct
strategy selection, to ensure that there are no permanently
extinct strategies. The pairwise comparison revision protocol
(eq. 2) is an example of direct strategy selection, and was first
proposed by Smith, who derived from it the Smith dynamics.
Candidate strategy j is chosen randomly from S.
ρij(pi) = [pij − pii]+ (2)
ρij(pi) =
exp(η−1pij)
exp(η−1pij) + exp(η−1pii)
(3)
Another more complex example are the exponential revision
protocols, like the pairwise logit protocol, shown in eq. 3. For
considerations of stochastic stability detailed in section IV-E,
this protocol is chosen in the MAS for modeling the strategy
revision and update process that generates the dynamic in
the game, as users will know available strategies set and can
make a direct choice, rather than copying the behavior of other
consumers. However, in the implementation phase it is made a
modification to the protocol, regarding the random selection of
candidate strategies. In order to accelerate convergence of the
dynamic, the selection is weakly restricted to a strategy that
enhances current payoff, similar to the best response dynamics
[24].
In a natural non-incentivized state, the MAS model of the
society receives as input the load profiles from the users
reflecting their valuation of electricity use during each con-
sumption period, which may be grouped under a few profiles
–if it was desired to model groups with similar preferences–
or individual independent profiles for each consumer, and
starting from an initial energy distribution, after the population
dynamics evolution the model outputs a reconstruction of the
load profile (see fig. 2). With this setting, the natural state of
the population can be altered through incentives.
IV. MECHANISM DESIGN AND INCENTIVES
The demand response problem using mechanims design and
population dynamics has already been adressed by other au-
thors like Barreto et al. [2], and the presented mechanism was
at first based on their work. They propose an indirect revelation
mechanism, based in VCG8 [29], incentive compatible and
achieving pareto optimality if incentives are used during the
transition period.
However, because of the difficulties that arose in the mod-
eling of real-world users and their appliances, the mechanism
implementation was changed by using a finite-population
setting and revision protocols directly rather than performing
analysis using the corresponding mean dynamic. The proposed
mechanism is incentive compatible with indirect revelation.
8Vickrey-Clarke-Grooves
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Figure 1. Example payoff range for the available strategies set.
A. Game Setting
Let a population P be formed by a group of users–
households–. Each user i has a set of N electricity powered
devices, and some usage preferences θi ∈ Θ for a number
of consumption periods T , that can be–or not– different for
each user and each period. Preferences Θ are related to a
set of strategies S = 1, 2, ...Σ for each consumption period,
associated to the proportion of the period that an user prefers
to use a device, i.e. consume an specified amount of energy.
Each user tries to maximize her utility, and the interaction
within the whole society can be stated as a population game,
where the fitness function for each user is her utility function,
with dynamics led by the pairwise logit protocol.
The utility function for each user i can be described as her
benefit of using the electricity minus its cost:
Ui = vi − ci (4)
Ui =
∑
n∈N
αiϑ
n
i − β(Qt)qni (5)
UP =
∑
i∈P
Ui (6)
Where Qt =
∑
i∈P qi and qi is the energy consumption
of user i for a period, meaning that the cost for user i
depends on the electricity usage of the whole population. The
electricity valuation αi = fβσi where f is an arbitrary factor.
ϑni = exp
(
−|xi − θi|
i
)
signals if the ith user consumption
is according to her preference for device n, for a given
period. Utility for each user-device combination has the form
shown in fig. 1, where the maximum surplus is obtained when
the consumption matches her preference θi for the specific
device.  is an elasticity coefficient meaning how stiff is her
consumption preference, and the total utility for each user is
the sum of the utilities for the devices set.
The maximization problem solved for each period using
and evolutionary approach can be stated as in eq. 7. As it is
shown in eq. 4, the users’ profit depends of their accuracy
following their own consumption preferences, and the surplus
amount depends on the subjective valuation given by each user
to the usage of the devices set they may own, with diverse
functionality like TVs, AC units, PCs and so on. As users’
preferences are private information, and even a given user
may not be fully aware and conscious of her own, it is not
feasible to know their true value and include it to the model
as part of an utility function that reflects actual consumer
behavior. It can be known, however, that in a population there
will always be a wide range for these preferences where the
minimum will be slightly higher than the consumed electricity
price and the maximum will be many times the price paid
for the electricity. Thus, population’s valuation is a real vector
α ∈ [c < αmin, αmax] shaped by the users’ subjective opinion.
maximize
q
UP (θ, q) =
∑
i∈P
(∑
n∈N
αni ϑ
n
i − β(Qt)qni
)
subject to qni ≥ 0, i = {1, . . . , P}, n = {1, . . . , N}
∆qni ∈ Qdevices
αni ∈ [β, αmax]
θni ∈ [0, 1]
(7)
In order to get an approximation to user preferences, it
is assumed that preferences are embedded in the aggregated
load profile for an user, and they can be extracted from it
via virtual demand disaggregation, as in high-resolution load
profiles generation. The following assumptions are considered:
Assumption 1. In natural state, consumption preferences for
a given user form by aggregation her load profile.
Assumption 2. Subjective users’ valuation of energy con-
sumption has an wide range that can be contained in a closed
numeric interval with equivalent effect to the real-world diffuse
valuation usually made by a person.
Assumption 2, makes possible to propose an opinion dy-
namics for the evolution in time of the consumers’ subjective
valuation of energy, stating an starting condition (initial valua-
tion), susceptibility and confidence–self and mutual– parame-
ters required by the Friedkin-Johnsen’s model to compute final
users’ valuation state.
The population game can run in parallel for each time
period, until the population state–load profile– reaches a stable
state.
B. Monetary Incentives
If we want to modify users’ energy consumption, incentives
must give users a higher surplus, for them to be willing to
change their strategies shifting away from natural preferences.
Punishment(negative) incentives are not considered in the
present work, as forced changes are not desired unless there
is a risk of outage or blackout.
I ≥ αϑ− β(Qt)q (8)
Monetary incentives can be fixed as:
I = γqredux (9)
where γ is the surplus for consuming away from preference
and qredux the reduced energy consumption.γ could be slightly
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larger than one, and its exact value when the mechanism is im-
plemented should be derived empirically for each population
under study.
Financial incentives should be constrained, as usually we
don’t want to reduce or increase consumption for all periods,
but for those with certain characteristics, as the periods with
power peaks. Depending on the specific interests of the central
organizer, the periods qualifying for incentives can be set
whether arbitrarily or as those exceeding certain consumption
levels.
C. Social (Non-monetary) Incentives
It is likely that monetary incentives are not always worthy
for domestic users considering their inherent low elasticity
(Only those with very low valuation would be sensitive to
changes in price). The other possibility to change energy
use9 is by changing user’s preferences directly, so they would
have maximum utility by realizing the new preferences. If
the initial belief(agreement) to a certain DR program, non-
monetary motivated, are known, we can model its evolution
using opinion dynamics, interpreting the result as a probability
of engage to the program and shift preferences accordingly.
Social incentives are introduced in the system via opinion
dynamics, associating ith user opinion to her probability to
agree with the proposed demand response reference profile.
This probability is also related to the subjective user valuation
given to the alternate benefit associated with the DR program.
Eqs. 10 to 12 show the incentivized utility function, where
if the user decides to engage the DR program will adapt her
preference until she reaches her flexibility limit, ε.
C ∼ Be(σdr) (10)
θinc = θ ±Cε; θinc ∈ [0, 1] (11)
Ui.soc = α exp
(
−|∆θinc|

)
− βq (12)
Where σdr: probability to engage with DR program. Thus,
the social incentive is the difference between the natural and
incentivized utility:
Isoc = Ui.soc −U (13)
D. Mechanism Properties
Understanding the mechanism as the allocation rule and
the resulting social choice, the proposed mechanism has the
following properties:
• Incentive compatibility (strategy proofness). As it can be
seen in fig. 1, the exponential utility function has an
unique value peak for each given user and device prefer-
ence. Thus, the dominant strategy is the one maximizing
utility.
• Indirect revelation, as preferences remain private and only
aggregate consumption is spread.
9By changing consumers’ behavior. Another option behavior-independent
is for example technology changes, making the same usage pattern (and users’
utility) less energy intensive.
• Contrary to traditional approach, social choice does not
need to choose from society individual preferences, but
states the energy consumption associated to the aggre-
gated preferences.
E. Convergence
Convergence and stability of the proposed model depends
on convergence of the forming dynamics, i.e. for opinion and
population. Population dynamics using pairwise comparison
revision protocol satisfy both Nash Stationarity–N.S. and
Positive Correlation–P.C., which are conditions that ensure
long term stability for the mean dynamic. Common studied
evolutionary games usually assume an infinite-population set-
ting, which allows to average away the stochastic noise in
the agent’s evolution, thus allowing a deterministic behavior
explained as the mean dynamic. In the finite-population set-
ting, the agents’ evolution can be seen as a Markov process
{XNt } with common jump rate between states, and transition
probabilities related to the payoffs of the revision protocol in
use.
Finite-state Markov processes are characterized by their
stationary distribution10 in very long time spans. Particularly,
if the process has the property of irreducibility, which means
that the process has non-zero probability for visiting any
state and will visit all possible states in finite time, then the
stationary distribution is unique and does not depend on initial
conditions; if it fulfills the property of reversibility, then the
stationary distribution adopts a simpler form and its calculation
becomes feasible for practical cases. Only two-strategy games
(under an arbitrary revision protocol) and potential games un-
der exponential revision protocols are known to be reversible
[24], [25], [27].
For the present demand management problem we can fix
the revision protocol as logit or logit pairwise as the game
always has more than two strategies but when only binary
consumption levels are considered, thus meeting the first
condition for known reversibility. The other condition needs
to demonstrate that the game proposed is a potential game.
When the number of agents is small, usually the effect of
a particular agent’s change of strategy in the population state
is not negligible; this is considered in the clever payoff [24]
evaluation, which has into account that the agent makes her
comparison against the modified population.
Propositon 1. The finite-population game with fitness function
F (Θ) = exp
(
−|∆θ|

)
− βq
where θ, , q ∈ Θ is the preferences matrix for the whole
population, is a potential game.
Proof. A finite-population game is a potential game if there
is a finite-potential function fN such that for any agent i the
payoff is defined by its discrete partial derivative [24, §11.5]
10If a process is described by this distribution at one time, it will be
described by the same distribution in any other time [24]
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: FNi (x) = f
N (x)− fN (x− 1
N
xi). If ∆θ = x− θ, and Θ is
fixed for a given user, we assume that F (Θ) = fN :
FNi (x) = exp
(
−|x− θ|

)
− βq −(
exp
(
−|x− θ|

)
− βq − exp
(
−|x
n
i − θni |

)
− βqni
)
(14)
= exp
(
−|x
n
i − θni |

)
− βqni (15)

As the proposed demand management game is a potential
game with direct exponential (logit) revision protocol, then
the underlying Markov process has stochastic stability, with
stationary distribution [24, §11.5,12.2]:
µNx =
1
KN
N !∏
k∈S
(Nxk)!
exp(η−1fN (x)). (16)
KN is determined by the requirement that
∑
x∈XN
µNx = 1.
V. MECHANISM IMPLEMENTATION, RESULTS AND
ANALYSIS
A. Users’ profile generation
The only available information regarding users’ consump-
tion in Colombia is the aggregated monthly consumption per
user sorted by strata, and the consumption distribution across
all strata registered by the network operator. In order to
input the information required by the model, an algorithm for
generating users’ profiles from the aggregate consumption is
needed. This algorithm should randomly generate a plausible
profile, taking into account assumptions about users’ electric
devices and their consumption, usage patterns and aggregated
monthly consumption so that the profile meets the monthly
consumption for a real-world user.
González et al. [10], [18] propose a model where the load
profile for an user is formed by the composition of several
devices’ profiles added up. Each device profile is generated
as an stochastic process with some assumptions about typical
usage for characterizing the probability distribution, and as-
sumptions about nominal power, established in a way that the
total energy for the generated profile is in the expected range
of measured consumption.
Colombian population (including electricity consumers) is
clasified among 6 strata (1 to 6) where users belonging to
stratum 1, 2 and 3 have financial subsidies in the tariff, and
users in stratum 5 and 6 are billed with over costs which
are used to subsidize the former users. Additionally, a typical
consumer belonging to a higher strata has higher income
and increased electricity consumption, even though the higher
percentiles of a low stratum overlaps with the lower percentiles
of higher strata.
In order to reflect this clustering in the multiagent system, an
algorithm for generating the variation was proposed. The load
profiles are considered as Markov chains, as in [13], where
they conclude that the method is useful for recreating overall
energy consumption but with somewhat inaccurate reflecting
exact behavior for individual devices. In the present case
however, those inaccuracies are not of concern as the actual
individual behavior is not known. Taking as starting point a
sample profile generated by González et al., which reflects
approximately the behavior and consumption levels for stratum
4, the algorithm uses maximum likelihood estimation to get an
approximate guess for the transmission and emission matrices
of the underlying Markov process that generates the profile.
The process is assumed to have two states for each device–on
and off– and the transition probabilities for related to the ON
state are then changed multiple times in small steps until the
mean consumption obtained with the modified Markov process
reflects the consumption for a given stratum.
Then, with the transition and emission matrices for all strata
available, the desired strata distributed profiles are generated
as input for the evolutionary model.
Algorithm 1 Markov process for strata estimation
1: procedure MATRIXADJUST
2: top:
3: if t == 1 then TRANStry ← TRANSref
4: if stratum > 4 then
5: increaseCons = True
6: if stratum < 4 then
7: increaseCons = False
8: else change TRANStry by delta
9:
10: from i=1 to numTest
11: generate Markov chain with TRANStry
12: testEnergy(i) ← energy consumption for case i
13:
14: avgEnergy ← mean(testEnergy)
15: if abs(goalEnergy − avgEnergy) ≤ tol then
16: TRANSadjusted ← TRANStry
17: return TRANSadjusted and break
18: else
19: update increaseCons depending on goalEnergy,
avgEnergy
20: t← t+ 1
21: go to: top
B. Population game
PDToolbox [1] was used as starting point, making mod-
ifications in order to enable finite-multipopulation revision
protocols and the required additions to include appropriately
the utility and fitness functions, and opinion dynamics into
the model. Modified code is available via GitHub at https:
//github.com/macortesgu/PDToolbox_matlab.
then fig. 4 represents how individuals reach a final opinion
about their collaboration in the DR program, being 0 none
cooperation, and 1 full agreement to the requests.
Running the game for a week with 6-hours periods11 with
P = 40 agents with average weekly consumption of approx-
11For a real-world application case shorter periods are recommended (5-15
min), as some short duration details for the load profiles and preferences are
lost when using long periods aggregation. However, for the sake of simplicity
and clarity the presented application case uses long periods.
DRAFT, FOR SUBMISSION TO THE IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRIDS, JANUARY 17, 2018 7
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Periods [360 min]
0
5
10
15
20
25
To
ta
l c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
in
 th
e 
so
cie
ty
 [k
W
]
Reference
MAS
Figure 2. Power allocation for the 40 individuals population, modeled using
Watts-Strogatz graph model.
imately 70 kWh, and valuation factor f = 712 the resulting
power allocation for the natural case–without incentives– is
shown in fig. 2, where the close resemblance of the original
aggregated load profile achieved by the MAS is evident,
though they are not exactly the same, mainly because the
stochastic nature of the finite-population dynamic. Next, for
the same population several scenarios are tested, for both
financial and social incentives.
Social incentives are tested with flexibility ε = 0.3 for a
low-collaboration case, reflected in the willingness to adhere
to the DR programs shown in fig. 4, a high-collaboration
optimistic case related to opinions in fig. 5 where almost
everyone embraces the DR program, and a third case where
users have high-collaboration and higher flexibility ε = 0.6.
The resulting power consumption evolution for the population
is in fig. 7 and the corresponding power allocation in figure 8.
It can be seen the progressive power decrease when more users
find the social incentive appealing and decide to enroll in the
DR program, but also the longer times until stable state is
reached. Due to the changes in utility, it is also more noticeable
the stochastic nature of the MAS. For the high-collaboration
case the power decrease is approximately 20%, and this could
be considered as the maximum shift potential given the user’s
restrictions, as usually domestic consumers are highly inelastic
and inflexible. In the figure 8 is shown that incentives were
applied in 11 of 28 periods, and the respective power during
each period. The fitness evolution for one user in the case of
low collaboration, disaggregated for each of her devices can
be seen in figure 6 where the step gains in fitness due to the
incentive are clear for some of the devices.
Financial incentives are set for two cases with 26 of the 28
periods incentivized, when the compensation received by the
users are 2β and 3β respectively. The corresponding power
evolution for the population is shown in fig. 9 and the final
power allocation per period in fig. 10. The resulting reduction
for the first case is roughly comparable to the one with
12Means that the users value the electricity used maximum at 7 times its
cost β.
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Figure 3. Users’ electricity valuation (opinion dynamics), described by eq. 1.
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Figure 4. Users’ collaboration, low collaboration scenario (opinion dynamics),
described by eq. 1.
low-collaboration social incentives, but the investment needed
to fund the incentives can be substantially higher. The case
where I = 3β shows a noticeably higher decrease, where the
collaborators are those whom value less their energy, and find
in the incentive higher profit than following their consumption
preferences. However, if the incentives need to be higher than
the electricity cost in most cases it is no feasible that an
interested agent as the network operator finds profitable the
implementation of financial incentives, specially if her income
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Figure 5. Users’ collaboration, optimistic scenario (opinion dynamics),
described by eq. 1.
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Figure 6. Fitness evolution for User 1 during the last period, low-collab
scenario (opinion dynamics). Each line represents the fitness for each device
the user has.
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Figure 7. Power evolution for the 40 individuals population, for different
incentives scenarios.
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Figure 8. Final power allocation at each period for the 40 individuals
population, for different incentives scenarios.
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Figure 9. Power evolution for the 40 individuals population, for different
financial incentives scenarios. β is the electricity unit cost.
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Figure 10. Final power allocation at each period for the 40 individuals
population, for different financial incentives scenarios.
is regulated and positive in the long term.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Scenario-based predictions can be done by setting the
opinion dynamics parameters with some desired values, and
watching the effect this opinion has in the electricity consump-
tion of users during a period, e.g. a week.
An indirect revelation, incentive compatible mechanism
for electricity demand management has been proposed. The
mechanism maximizes domestic users’ utility, achieved when
their consumption matches their private preferences. Monetary
and non-monetary incentives are also proposed for changing
total consumed energy, whether it may be an increase or a
decrease for certain consumption periods. In order to validate
the mechanism, it has been proposed a MAS model of the
users, that reproduce a given consumption profile in its natural
state, before applying the desired incentives, helping to shift
loads and lower peaks, within the technical restrictions of
the users. A test scenario where social incentives are used
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to increase consumption efficiently constrained by users’ pur-
chasing power is studied by Cortés et al.in [28].
The proposed MAS is based on a finite population game and
uses discrete energy levels that reflect the actual characteristics
of commonly used home appliances and devices. It also has
a fitness function that accounts for users subjective valuation
of electricity, given the specific device that uses the energy,
obtaining a more realistic approach to the problem.
The precise effect of the network characteristics, type of
random network used in the model and stubborn or prominent
agents has yet to be determined, as well as further adjustments
contrasting the predictions obtained with the simulations with
real-world scale deployment of incentives.
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